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  1. Foundation Leaders Divided on Legislation, Survey Finds - IssueLab
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It is thus consistent with our expectations that participation has been the dominant NGO response in Canada. Uncertainty about the scope of some provisions in the new counterterrorism regulation, particularly the definition of terrorist activities and concerns that this may outlaw previously legal forms of political dissent, has sparked some litigation for clarification. In the case R. Khawaja, Justice Rutherford of the Ontario Supreme Court determined that parts of the definition violated section two of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, however the list of offenses included in the Anti-Terrorism Act was acceptable Carter et al.

Given the scope of changes in counterterrorism regulation after , and thus the potential risks for political targeting of NGOs via a broad application of government powers, a mix of litigation and participation is largely consistent with our expectations. It is unclear, however, if the VSI has eliminated hiding and shirking by most NGOs, given the close working relations many NGOs have with the government, or if participation simply overshadows incidents of shirking or hiding.

Although civil society's response to counterterrorism measures in the UK has been slow and relatively isolated until CCS , 5 , there appears to be a movement toward more involvement by NGOs, mostly of the participatory type.

war on terror

Some NGO responses are more confrontational. For instance, because civil society had not been "meaningfully" consulted in the drafting of the Home Office review on the protection of charities from terrorist abuse, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations NCVO produced its own report on the impact of counter-terrorism measures on civil society Quigley and Pratten Others responses are more conciliatory.

Whether confrontational or conciliatory, these responses are all participatory in nature because they seek to engage government regulators and arrive at mutually beneficial legislation. The increase in the severity of counter-terrorist regulations was minimal in the UK, with the addition of the "glorification" provision but unchanged penalties for acts of terrorism. Based on our hypotheses, this would potentially suggest hiding, but no evidence confirmed such a reaction.

However, NGOs have easy access to political institutions and a sense of political efficacy in the UK, which enables participation. The UK government demonstrated its willingness to enforce counter-terrorist legislation by expanding the powers of the Charity Commission, but the position of the Commission as both independent enforcer and adviser to the NGO community limited active NGO resistance.

Moreover, by demonstrating its independence from the American government and its impartiality, notably in the Interpal case, we believe that the Commission was able to establish a relationship of trust with civil society that is not as present in the other countries under study. Japanese counterterrorism measures have traditionally and contemporarily targeted emergency response and civil defense, rather than any perceived threat from an overlap between civil society and terrorist organizations.

As changes to counterterrorism regulations post have been minor and unrelated to NGOs' activities or interests, the lack of NGO response to counterterrorism regulation in Japan is unsurprising. NGOs in Japan have not needed to hide or shirk counterterrorism regulation. Their participation in policy-making is institutionally limited, given the corporatist nature of Japanese governance Lijphart and Crepaz and NGOs' strict control by executive agencies Pekkanen There have been no attempts at litigation on counterterrorism regulations by NGOs in Japan. Vocal opposition has clearly been the favored resistance type in Germany.

A group of German NGOs, led by Humanistische Union Humanist Union , produces an annual report detailing state human rights abuses, notably through its increased surveillance powers. Some of the accusations include inappropriate treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, excessive use of force by police officers, unconstitutional investigations and raids against journalists, and violations of privacy see for example AI, ; Banisar, ; IHF, The European Federation of Journalists EFJ opposed a counter-terrorism law that would force journalists to divulge their sources if asked.

Although new counter-terrorist regulations were largely consistent with prior regulations, there were some significant departures, such as the suspension of the religious privilege. The German government also markedly increased surveillance powers by providing new technological tools and allowing agencies to put individuals under surveillance without informing them.

Major regulatory changes and demonstrations of governmental capacity and willingness to enforce the new regulations suggest active NGO resistance, either through vocal opposition or participation.

Foundation Leaders Divided on Legislation, Survey Finds - IssueLab

The evidence corroborates our expectations as major acts of protest, often by reputable NGOs, have taken place in Germany. Furthermore, we argued that uncertainty about regulations and the failure of other means of response should lead to resistance through litigation. The German experience supports this expectation.

There were no clear boundaries to the vast expansion of surveillance powers in Germany, leading to abuse by police forces and multiple appeals to courts by NGOs and interest groups to reestablish a balance. We find that in five cases of relatively similar countries experiencing a common threat in the form of transnational terrorism, the responses of NGOs have varied substantially. In the cases of the US and Germany, where regulations changed the most, NGOs engaged in vocal opposition and litigation, the most active and confrontational responses.


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In the UK and Canada, where regulation changed somewhat but in ways consistent with past regulation, NGOs participated in policy-making processes to refine and reform the new rules. Our hypotheses were roughly supported—minor changes in rules Japan brought less active responses than major changes US and Germany ; major changes that created uncertainty produced litigation to clarify new rules US, Germany, and Canada ; increased monitoring by the government reduced shirking US and Germany ; and in cases in which governments provided institutions to enable NGOs to participate, they did so UK and Canada.

While we have focused on counterterrorism regulations, we believe that the same ideal type NGO responses—hiding, shirking, vocal opposition, participating, and litigating—would be found in response to changes in other aspects of NGOs' regulatory environment. Furthermore, the same three factors—the extent and nature of any change in regulations, the uncertainty and risk that changes create, and the nature of institutions for political participation—would be important for explaining why NGOs respond as they do to national changes in regulation.

Efforts to clarify and specify counterterrorism measures, and their direct impact on NGOs, would likely help to reduce vocal opposition and litigation. That said, if counterterrorism measures are highly constraining and authoritarian, NGOs are likely to continue to work to change these measures, some working collaborative with government, some shirking, and others acting openly in opposition to government. NGO hiding and shirking is likely to prove threatening for both national security and NGOs' political development in the long run.

These behaviors may result in a loss of accountability and legitimacy as well as deteriorating relationships between NGOs and government. Hiding and shirking are also symptoms of collective action failure, and a coordinated global campaign may be needed by NGOs to press for more NGO-friendly and effective counterterrorism measures cross-nationally.

Amnesty International AI.

NGO ‘Blacklist’ Unfair and Arbitrary, Groups Say

September 8. Banisar, David. Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World. Baron, Barnett F. Betsill, Michele, and Elisabeth Corell, eds. NGO Diplomacy. Billica, Nancy.

Bloodgood, Elizabeth. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Bloodgood, Elizabeth, and Joannie Tremblay-Boire.

kamishiro-hajime.info/voice/logiciel/logiciel-espion-samsung-note-7-mini.php DOI: Brock, Kathy L. Buchanan, Rob. Bush, George W. Carter, Terrance S. Carter, and Nancy E. Charities Act c. Office of Public Sector Information. Charnovitz, Steve. Committee of Experts on Terrorism Codexter. Department of Justice Canada. HTML accessed February 4, DiMaggio, Paul J. Dotan, Yoav, and Menachem Hofnung. Dunn, Alison. Embassy of Japan, Washington D.

German Criminal Code as Amended on 5 November Michael Bohlander. Federal Ministry of Justice. Guinane, Kay. Counterterrorism Developments Impacting Charities. Haubrich, Joseph. Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism.

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Heins, Volker. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hirschman, Albert. Hirschl, Ran. Horn, Murray J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. One would assume that Chiquita's admission would warrant the more severe consequences. Not to mention the countless other victims who were beneficiaries of these organization's philanthropic activities. Educate Your Representatives Congressional representatives and staffers are alarmingly unaware of the valuable philanthropic work being done by international grantmakers. Even more significant, they are mostly oblivious to the existing and potential consequences of regulations and legislation on that philanthropic work.

Meetings can be scheduled at representatives' D. Click here to download the letter template.

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Gifts to donor-advised funds, supporting organizations, and private foundation do not qualify under this provision. Click here to download the sign-on letter. All rights reserved. For more information contact us at GwoB gwob. The instructions for Schedule F, Part II, Line 2 fail to preempt any misconception about the legality of grantmaking public charities supporting organizations not recognized within their foreign country or equivalent to a c 3 public charity.

Why does the definition for "foreign individual" include U. Inadequate instructions for Schedule F, Question 3 could dissuade grantmaking public charities from making highly impactful international advocacy grants. Furthermore, the legal definition of lobbying can be difficult to apply in international settings. Consequently, additional guidance is needed. Schedule F must be afforded some degree of privacy and confidentiality in order to protect the work and lives of grantees that operate in hostile environments.

Even more significant, they are mostly oblivious to the existing and potential consequences of regulations and legislation on that philanthropic work. Meetings can be scheduled at representatives' D. Click here to download the letter template. Gifts to donor-advised funds, supporting organizations, and private foundation do not qualify under this provision.

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Click here to download the sign-on letter. All rights reserved. For more information contact us at GwoB gwob. The instructions for Schedule F, Part II, Line 2 fail to preempt any misconception about the legality of grantmaking public charities supporting organizations not recognized within their foreign country or equivalent to a c 3 public charity. Why does the definition for "foreign individual" include U. Inadequate instructions for Schedule F, Question 3 could dissuade grantmaking public charities from making highly impactful international advocacy grants. Furthermore, the legal definition of lobbying can be difficult to apply in international settings.

Consequently, additional guidance is needed. Schedule F must be afforded some degree of privacy and confidentiality in order to protect the work and lives of grantees that operate in hostile environments. The repository may be viewed as a database of "legitimate" NGOs. This ignores the fact that some NGOs that work on contentious issues in volatile locations may choose not to participate in the repository for safety and privacy reasons many progressive human rights organizations fall into this category.

Some grantmakers may rely exclusively on the repository as the on-line catalogue of foreign grantees, unfairly excluding those NGOs that are unable to participate or choose not to do so.